This paper describes an algorithm for model checking a fragment of the logic of knowledge and probability in multi-agent systems, with respect to a perfect recall interpretation of knowledge and agents' subjective probability. The algorithm has been implemented in the epistemic model checker MCK. Some experiments with the implemented algorithm are reported, in which some properties of agents' probabilistic knowledge are verified in two security protocols: Chaum's Dining Cryptographers protocol, and a protocol for Oblivious Transfer due to Rivest.
INTRODUCTION
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Model checking has been most extensively studied for the case where the system can be represented as a finite state automaton, and the specification expressed in a linear or branching time temporal logic; this type of model checking is now a standard verification methodology in computer hardware development. Model checking has also been studied for temporal logics in which the temporal operators are extended with probabilistic expressiveness, in the form of a type of objective probability: the models considered are either discrete-time Markov chains, continuous-time Markov chains or Markov Decision processes [15] . More recently, model checkers have emerged for which the base logic is a logic of knowledge and time [11, 18, 16, 26] or dynamic update logic [30] .
To date, there has been no implemented model checking system that deals with the logic of knowledge, time and the subjective probability, i.e., probability relative to agent knowledge. The model checking system that we develop for this combination in this paper is based on the logic of knowledge and probability [10] , which adds to the logic of knowledge the ability to express facts about probability (implicitly) conditioned on what an agent knows, using expressions such as "Agent i's probability of formula φ is greater than 1/2". We follow one of the semantics of Halpern and Tuttle [14] , in which agent's probabilistic knowledge is determined using the assumption of synchronous perfect recall. The models that we handle are in the form of discrete-time Markov chains. Our approach to model checking this logic is a generalisation of an approach, due to van der Meyden and Su [28] , using symbolic model checking techniques for model checking a fragment of the logic of knowledge and time with perfect recall.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We introduce the semantics for the logic of knowledge, probability and time in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe a fragment of this logic, and our approach to model checking this fragment. Section 4 briefly describes the implementation of the algorithm in the model checker MCK. Section 5 then gives a number of applications of the implemented system to verification of security protocols. We discuss related work in Section 6 and make some concluding remarks in Section 7.
PROBABILISTIC KNOWLEDGE
We describe in this section the semantic setting for the model checking problem we consider. We largely follow the definitions of probabilistic interpreted systems [12] , in which we model a set of agents Agt = {1, . . . , n} operating in an environment e. At all times, each agent is assumed to be in some local state, which records all the information that the agent can access at that time. The environment e records "everything else that is relevant". Let S be the set of environment states and let L i be the set of local states of agent i ∈ Agt. A global state of a multi-agent system is a (n + 1)-tuple s = (s e , s 1 , . . . , s n ) such that s e ∈ S and s i ∈ L i for all i ∈ Agt.
Time is represented discretely using the natural numbers N. A run is a function r : N → S × L 1 × . . . × L n from time to global states. A pair (r, m) consisting of a run r and time m is called a point. If r(m) = (s e , s 1 , . . . , s n ) then we define r e (m) = s e and r i (m) = s i for i ∈ Agt. If r is a run and m a time, we write r e [0..m] for r e (0) . . . r e (m). A system is a set R of runs. We call R × N the set of points of the system R. Relative to a system R, we define the set K i (r, m) = {(r , m ) ∈ R × N | r i (m ) = r i (m)} to be the set of points that are, for agent i, indistinguishable from the point (r, m), and R(U) = {r ∈ R | ∃m : (r, m) ∈ U} to be the set of runs in R going through some point in the set U ⊆ R × N. Agents have synchronous perfect recall in system R if there exists a set O (of observations) such that for each point (r, m) of R and agent i, the local state r i (m) is a sequence of exactly (m + 1) elements of O, and
A probability space is a triple (W, F, µ) such that W is a set, called the carrier, F ⊆ P(W) is a set of measurable sets in W, closed under union and complementation, and µ :
As usual, we define the conditional probability
A probabilistic interpreted system is a tuple (R, PR 1 , . . . , PR n , π) such that R is a system, each PR i is a function mapping each point (r, m) of R to a probability space PR i (r, m) in which the carrier is a set of points of R, and π : R × N → P(Prop) is an interpretation of some set Prop of atomic propositions.
We will work with systems in which agents have a common prior on the set of runs and synchronous perfect recall. Let R be a system, let P = (R, F R , µ R ) be a probability space on the system R, and let π be an interpretation on R. We assume that for each point (r, m) of R and agent i, the set R(K i (r, m)) is measurable and µ R (R(K i (r, m))) > 0. we then derive a probabilistic interpreted system I(R, P, π) = (R, PR 1 , . . . , PR n , π) such that PR i associates with each point (r, m) the probability space PR i (r, m) = (K i (r, m), F i,r,m , µ r,m,i ) such that F i,r,m is the set of U ∈ P(K i (r, m)) such that R(U) ∈ F R , and
It is easily shown that it follows from the assumptions that PR i (r, m) is a probability space. Intuitively, at each point, each agent has a probability space in which the carrier is the set of points K i (r, m) that it considers possible, and which is related to the prior on runs by a type of temporal conditioning. (See [12] for a detailed explanation of these definitions and this point.)
To specify properties of probabilistic interpreted systems, we work with a logic that combines temporal operators, knowledge operators, and probabilistic operators. Its syntax is given by the grammar
where p ∈ Prop, c is a rational constant, is a relation symbol in the set {≤, <, =, >, ≥}, and L(P 1 , . . . , P k ) is a rational linear combination of the P j , each of which is of one of the forms Pr i φ, Pr i (φ 1 |φ 2 ), Prior i φ or Prior i (φ 1 |φ 2 ). Intuitively, formula K i φ expresses that agent i knows φ, Xφ expresses that φ holds at the next moment of time, the expression Pr i φ represents agent i's current probability of φ, the expression Pr i (φ 1 |φ 2 ) represents agent i's current probability of φ 1 under the condition φ 2 , the expression Prior i φ represents agent i's prior probability of φ, Prior i (φ 1 |φ 2 ) represents agent i's prior probability of φ 1 under the condition φ 2 , and L(P 1 , . . . , P k ) c expresses that this linear combination of current and prior probabilities stands in the relation to c. The semantics of the language in a system I = I(R, P, π) is given by interpreting formulas φ at points (r, m) of I, using a satisfaction relation I, (r, m) | = φ. We first interpret the probability expressions at points of I as in Table 1. The satisfaction relation is then defined recursively as follows, omitting the obvious boolean cases:
We already noted above that some assumptions on P are required for the construction of I = I(R, P, π). The above semantics additionally assumes that the sets whose probability is evaluated in Table 1 are measurable. We introduce a more concrete setting in what follows that ensures these assumptions are met.
Although they provide a coherent semantic framework, probabilistic interpreted systems are infinite structures, and therefore not suitable as input for a model checking algorithm. We therefore work with a type of finite model called an interpreted partially observed discrete-time Markov chain, or PO-DTMC for short. A finite PO-DTMC for n agents is a tuple M = (S , PI, PT, O 1 , ..., O n , π), where S is a finite set of states, PI : S → [0..1] is an initial probability function such that s∈S PI(s) = 1, component PT : S × S → [0, 1] is a probability transition matrix, such that s ∈S PT (s, s ) = 1 for all s ∈ S , and for each agent i ∈ Agt, we have an observation function O i : S → O for agent i. Finally, π : S → P(Prop) is an interpretation of the atomic propositions Prop at the states. We treat the set of states S as the states of the environment rather than as the set of global states. Intuitively, O i (s) is the observation that agent i makes when the system is in state s; agents' local states will be derived from these observations.
We write k i (s) = {s ∈ S | O i (s ) = O i (s)} for the set of states that are observationally indistinguishable to agent i from state s. We write s p → s if PT (s, s ) = p > 0, and s → s if PT (s, s ) > 0. A path from a state s is a finite or infinite sequence of states ρ = s 0 s 1 . . . such that s 0 = s and s k → s k+1 for all k less than the length of ρ. Given a path ρ, we use ρ(m) to denote its (m + 1)-th state. A fullpath from a state s is an infinite path from s. A path ρ is initialized if PI(ρ(0)) > 0.
We may construct several different probabilistic interpreted systems from each PO-DTMC, depending on what agents' remember of their observations. In this paper, we concentrate on a definition that assumes agents have synchronous perfect recall, denoted spr. Recall that runs map time to global states consisting of a state of the environment and a local state for each agent, and we interpret the states of the PO-DTMC as states of the environment. Thus, to construct a run, we use the observations to construct the local states. Given an initialized fullpath ρ, we obtain a run ρ spr by defining the components at each time m as follows. The environment state at time m is ρ 
ρ(m).
We now define a probability space on the set of runs we generate as above from the environment, using a well-known construction. Let R be the set of runs in M. Given a finite initialized path ρ of length m + 1, write R(ρ) = {r ∈ R | r e [0 . . . m] = ρ} for the set of runs with prefix ρ for the environment part. (One may view this as a cone of runs over prefix ρ.) Let F R be the minimal algebra with basis the sets R(ρ) for ρ a finite initialized path of M, i.e., the set of all sets of runs that can be constructed from the basis using union and complementation. Suppose we define the measure µ R on the basis sets by
There is a unique extension of µ R to F R that satisfies the constraints on probability measures (i.e., finite additivity and universality), and we also denote this by µ R . It can then be shown that P(M) = (R, F R , µ R ) is a probability space on R.
The system M gives us an interpretation π on its states, and we may lift this to an interpretation on the points (r, m) of R by defining π(r, m) = π(r e (m)). Using the construction above, we then obtain the probabilistic interpreted system I(M) = I(R, P(M), π). We noted above that the construction of a system I(R, P, π) requires an assumption on P, and moreover, the measurability of sets arising during the evaluation of a formula introduces a further assumption. For the systems I(R, P(M), π) and the language we consider in this paper, these assumptions are met, as is shown in the following result. PROPOSITION 1. Let M be a finite PO-DTMC. Then the sets R(K i (r, m)) are measurable and have non-zero measure. Also, for all formulas φ, the sets
We will be interested in the problem of model checking formulas in this system. A formula φ is said to hold in M, written M | = φ, if I(M), (r, 0) | = φ for all r ∈ R. The model checking problem is then to determine, given a PO-DTMC M and a formula φ, whether M | = φ.
A SYMBOLIC MODEL CHECKING AL-GORITHM
The question of model checking the logic of knowledge and time (without probabilities) with respect to perfect recall has been studied in a number of works [27, 19] , which identify various fragments for which the problem is decidable. Decidability does not imply practical feasibility, however, and for this further restrictions and special algorithms are required. An algorithm that has proved useful in practice was introduced by van der Meyden and Su [28] ; it works on formulas of the form X k φ where φ is a formula in which the only modal operator is K i , for a fixed agent i. While restricted, this algorithm has been successfully applied to interesting case studies including security protocols [28, 1] , card games [29] and cache coherency [2] . A typical application is to verify formulas of the form
, where φ is a global property and l i is a predicate local to agent i; this class of formulas is useful for verifying implementations of knowledge-based programs [9] .
In this section, we generalize this algorithm to the language of the present paper, in which we add probabilistic expressiveness. The generalization works for formulas of the form of the form X d ϕ with the only modal operators in ϕ being the knowledge operator K i and the probability operators Pr i and Prior i , for a single, fixed agent i. An example of such a formula is
expressing that after d steps, if agent i knows the fact ϕ 1 then it knows ϕ 2 with a probability no more than c. These properties are useful in characterizing the posterior probability on agent i's knowledge after some number of steps. Note that the number of possible paths of length d in a system with states S is potentially as large as |S | d , so that specifications of the form we consider refer to a structure that grows exponentially with d in the worst case; indeed, the number of states S already grows exponentially in the number of boolean variables used to define a state. A naive implementation of model checking would therefore need to work with exponentially large structures, and would not be practical. The idea underlying our algorithm is to work with symbolic representations of certain functions that encode the information required for model checking. Because they condense symmetries, these symbolic representations are, in practice, often more compact than the information they represent (although there is not a guarantee of this in general -the technique is merely heuristic). We first define the functions we represent, and later discuss the symbolic representation (multi-terminal OBDD's) that the algorithm uses to encode these functions.
Let i be the agent whose modal operators occur in the formula we wish to evaluate. For each number k ≥ 0 and ϕ a formula in which the only modal operators are knowledge and probability operators of agent i, we define several functions 
Let
The following theorem shows that we may characterize the model checking problem using the functions T k and T k ϕ . THEOREM 1. Let M be a PO-DTMC with states S and set of observations O for the unique agent whose modalities occur in the atemporal formula ϕ.
One of the keys to our algorithm is then the fact that the functions in Definition 1 satisfy some equations that enable them to be constructed by means of a mutual recursion, that can be encoded using a symbolic representation that we describe later. THEOREM 2. The functions T k , P k satisfy following equations:
The functions T k φ , P k φ satisfy the following:
We remark that the expressions for T k φ contain occurrences of the term T k (o 0 ...o k , s). In the context of the right hand side of the formula in Theorem 1, these terms always evaluate to 1 and may be eliminated. This is an optimization done in our algorithm. 
Symbolic Data Structures
As we noted above, the size of the set of runs of a given length k grows exponentially. The same applies to the tabular representation of the functions T k and P k . Our symbolic algorithm attempts to deal with this exponential growth by representing these functions more compactly than as an input-output table, using two types of data structures: (reduced) ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDD) [3] and multi-terminal binary decision diagrams (MTBDD) [6] . These structures are defined as follows.
Let V be a set of variables. A V-assignment is a function s : V → {0, 1}. Write Assgts(V) for the set of all V-assignments, and s[v → x] for the function that is identical to s except that it takes value x on input v. A V-indexed boolean function is a mapping f : Assgts(V) → {0, 1}. Note that such functions are able to represent sets X ⊆ Assgts(V) by their characteristic functions f X , mapping s to 1 just in case s ∈ X. One way to represent such a function f is using a binary tree of height n, with each level corresponding to one of the variables in V, and leaves labelled from {0, 1}. This tree can in turn be thought of as a finite state automaton on alphabet {0, 1}. Reduced 1 OBDD's more compactly represent such a function as a dag of height n, with binary branching, by applying the usual finite state automaton minimization algorithm. A very simple example of this for the function f (a, b, c) = a xor b is illustrated in Figure 1 . In some cases, the degree of compaction obtained in the minimal dag representation is considerable. We note that the amount of compaction obtained is sensitive to the variable ordering used, and finding a variable ordering that minimizes the result is NP-hard, though there exist good heuristics, such as sifting [23] .
Given this minimal representation of V-indexed boolean functions, it is moreover possible to compute (in practice, often in reasonable time) some operations on these functions, by means of algorithms that take as input the reduced OBDD representation of the input functions and returns the reduced OBDD representation of the result. The operations for which this can be done include the following:
• Boolean operations ∧, ¬, defined pointwise on functions. E.g., if f, g :
• Boolean quantification ∃, ∀, e.g., if f :
(Reduced) MTBDD's generalize (reduced) OBDD's by allowing finitely many real numbers as the leaves, instead of the two values 0, 1. This gives a compact representation for a V-indexed function, i.e.., a mapping f : Assgts(V) → R. As with OBDD's, we may perform certain operations on the represented functions directly at the level of their reduced OBDD representations, e.g.,
• Arithmetic operations +, −, ×, ÷, etc. For instance, if f, g :
• Summation operation . If f :
• Given this input, the symbolic algorithm proceeds by constructing an MTBDD representation for the universally quantified formula in Theorem 1, using the recurrences of Theorem 2 for terms of the form
. Each argument o j here corresponds to a set of MTBDD variables Obs i, j in one-toone correspondence to Obs i , and the argument s corresponds to the variables Prop. The recurrences can then each be straightforwardly represented using the MTBDD operations over MTBDD's over the appropriate set of variable.
We give just one example of this representation here, for recurrence 4 of Theorem 2. Suppose we have an MTBDD representation rep 1 of the function P k (o 0 ...o k , s) using variables (∪ j=0...k Obs i, j ) ∪ Prop, representation rep 2 of PT (s, s ) using variables Prop∪Prop , and representation rep 3 of (O i (s) = o k+1 ) using variables Prop. We treat each of these as MTBDD's over the set of variables 
IMPLEMENTATION IN MCK
We have implemented the symbolic algorithm describe above as an extension of MCK, a model checker for the logic of knowledge and time [11] . MCK takes as input a script that describes a multiagent system, in which the behaviour of agents is represented using a simple programming language. The script declares a set of agents, a set of variables shared by the agents, and describes how transitions occur as a function of actions chosen by the agents, by means of a program. Agents choose their actions by executing a protocol, also in the form of a program. This program may declare further variables that are local to the agent executing it. It also indicates which of the local and shared variables are observable to the agent. Finally, the program describes how the agent chooses its actions as a function of these variables at each step of execution. States of the system are derived as assignments to the shared, local and program counter variables. Initial states are described using a boolean formula over these variables.
In order to develop the probabilistic extension of MCK, we replace the non-deterministic if construct in the MCK programming language by a weighted if construct. The syntax of the latter is of the form if w 1 :
where the w i are rational numbers, the φ i are boolean expressions and the P i are programs. If all weights are equal, the prefix "w i :" may be elided. Intuitively, this construct corresponds to a probabilistic transition to the programs P i , and is executed from state s as follows. Let w = i=1...k, s| =φ i w i . Then if s | = φ i , we make a transition to P i with probability 0, otherwise we make the transition to P i with probability w i /w. (If all φ i are false, we skip over the statement.)
The formal semantics of the extended MCK scripts construct a PO-DTMC from the input script. Examples of input scripts in the extended language are given in the following section.
The implementation of the MTBDD-based model checking algorithm described above uses the MTBDD capabilities of the CUDD package [25] .
APPLICATIONS
To investigate the application of the algorithm described above, we have used the MCK implementation to verify several security properties in two protocols: Chaum's Dining Cryptographers protocol [5] and an oblivious transfer protocol due to Rivest [22] . These protocols have previously been the subject of analysis by epistemic model checking (starting with [28] , which uses an algorithm that we have generalized in this paper), so it is interesting to compare the epistemic versions (which use only on the operator K i ) with the probabilistic approach of the present paper. We report performance results for our implementation. All experiments in the paper were conducted on an iMac computer with 3.06GHz Intel Core i3 processor and 4GB memory.
Oblivious Transfer Protocol
The objectives of an oblivious transfer protocol are as follows: Alice has two secrets m 0 and m 1 . Bob would like to learn one of these secrets, but does not wish to reveal to Alice which secret he chooses. Various approaches have been proposed by which this may be achieved. In Rivest's solution [22] , a trusted third party Ted is used, who helps Alice and Bob by providing some random material, that they use once they decide to run the protocol. (The point is that Ted's participation is not required at runtime: if this were allowed then there is of course a trivial solution in which Alice sends Ted her messages, and Bob requests the message he wants from Ted.) The random material consists of two random strings r 0 , r 1 of the same length as Alice's messages, and a random bit d. Identical copies of these values are delivered by Ted to both Alice and Bob. To request a string c, Bob then sends Alice the value e = c ⊕ d (where ⊕ is the exclusive-or operation, which we assume operates pointwise on strings of equal length.). Alice responds with the messages f 0 = m 0 ⊕r e and f 1 = m 1 ⊕r 1−e . From this information, Bob is able to compute m c as f c ⊕ r d , but this exchange leaves Alice ignorant of which message Bob chose, and leaves Bob ignorant of the value of Alice's other message.
The following is precise description of the protocol in the MCK programming language for the case where Alice's message has length 2 bits. We first declare the variables required and their types. The expression "Bool[n]" denotes the type of Boolean vectors of length n. Comments are prefixed by "--". --a value computed by Bob and sent to Alice e : Bool --values computed by Alice and sent to Bob f0 : Bool [2] f1 : Bool [2] Since not all assignments to these variables constitute a valid initial state, we next define the valid initial states as all states satisfying a formula over these variables:
The semantics of this construct places a uniform distribution over the set of global states that satisfy the initial condition.
We then declare the agents in the system:
agent Alice "alice" (r0, r1, m0, m1, f0, f1, e) agent Bob "bob" (rd, d, c, f0, f1, mc)
Each of these statements first gives the name of the agent, then (in quotes) the name of the protocol being executed by the agent, and then lists the variables to which that protocol has access. For example, the above statements say that Alice has access to variables r0 and r1, but Bob does not.
MCK splits the description of state transitions into two parts: in each step, each agent's protocol is used to select an action for each agent (this choice may be probabilistic, using the weighted if statement introduced above). These choices are then provided as input to the transitions clause, another program that computes the values of global variables in the next state from the values in the current state and the agent's actions. This program may also use the weighted if statement. In our modelling of Rivest's protocol, most of the work is done in the transitions clause rather than in the agent's protocols: Here Alice.SendMessages is a proposition indicating that Alice has chosen to perform her action SendMessages in this step. Superficially, the transitions clause uses the weighted if statement, but we note that since the conditions prove to be mutually exclusive in all runs, the actual probabilities in the model come entirely from the distribution over the initial states.
The agents' protocols simply select the appropriate action depending on the stage of the protocol. In the first step Bob performs the action Sendrequest, next Alice performs SendMessages, and finally Bob performs Compute. The notation "<< . >>" is used to signify an action. The label observable is used to indicate that a variable is a part of the agent's observation in a global state. The objectives of the protocol can be captured by the formulas in Table 2 . Formula (1) says that Bob knows that the message mr (which the protocol uses to represent the message that Bob receives) is equal to the message that he requested. Formula (2) says that from Alice's point of view, the probability of either choice c by Bob is the same. Formula (3) says that if c = 1, i.e., Bob chooses to receive m1, then Bob does not learn the value of the other message m0. Since it is assumed that m0 m1, Bob does know that m0 is not equal to the message m1 he has received. The formula says that from Bob's point of view, if he chooses message m1, then Bob's considers no fixed value m of m0 more probable than any other fixed value m . (Appealing to symmetry, we model check this for just two possible fixed values m , m .)
We have used our implementation to verify that the protocol satisfies all three formulas. To test how well our algorithm scales, we have performed experiments in which we parameterize the protocol on the length of messages m0,m1, represented as Boolean vectors of length n. For our modelling, the state-space of the protocol itself grows as 2 7n+c (in the initial state, there are 8 boolean vectors of length n, but the value of rd is dependent) so that the expected performance of a naive algorithm that explicitly generates the entire state-space in order to evaluate the formulae would be exponential. Figure 2 plots the runtimes for specification (1) in a base 2 logscale. For purposes of comparison with non-probabilistic epistemic model checking, we also plot the runtimes obtained using the algorithm of [28] on the epistemic logic formulation
on a variant of the model in which the initial probabilities are ignored. In both cases, the sifting optimization was used during BDD construction (invoked in MCK with the flag -rs). Fitting a straight line to the data yields an approximation of y = 0.24x + 1.2 (with norm of residuals 1.7) for the purely epistemic specification and y = 0.24x + 2 (with norm of residuals 1.9) for the probabilistic specification (1) . Compared to the expected curve of at least y = 7x + c for a brute force model checking approach based on explicit generation of all states and traces, this suggests that our symbolic model checking approach yields a significant optimization that brings problems of considerable scale into the range of feasibility. (Note that the largest of our examples involve more than 2 7×35 = 5.7×10 73 states.) Interestingly, in this example, the addition of probabilistic model checking capability has come at only a small cost over the cost of epistemic model checking. The runtimes for all three specifications together turns out to be only slightly larger than those for just formula (1), since much of the MTBDD construction is shared between specifications.
The Dining Cryptographers Protocol
The Dining Cryptographers protocol [5] is intended to allow anonymous message transmission. Chaum introduced it by the following story. Three cryptographers are sitting down to dinner at their favorite three-star restaurant. Their waiter informs them that ar- One of the cryptographers might be paying for the dinner, or it might have been the NSA (US National Security Agency). The three cryptographers respect each other's right to make an anonymous payment, but they wonder if the NSA is paying. In order to resolve this question, they devise a protocol that operates as follows: each flips a coin, and privately shares the outcome with their neighbour to the right around the (circular) table. They then each publicly announce whether the outcome of their own coin and the coin shared by their neighbour to the left are the same, except that if they paid for the dinner, they invert their answer. The answer to the question about the NSA can then be determined from the exclusive-or of the public announcements, and it can be shown that in case one of the cryptographers paid, their identity is not revealed to the others. The idea generalizes to n cryptographers in a ring (indeed, to connected graphs of cryptographers). In the following, we assume n cryptographers in a ring and let i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The anonymity property has been represented in previous work on epistemic analysis of the protocol using the formula (1) of Table 3 which says that, in case agent i pays, agent j i cannot eliminate the possibility that any other agent k {i, j} paid. Here d is the number of steps taken to complete the protocol (which depends on the details of the modelling).
While this formula gives some interesting information about the protocol, it does not provide a completely satisfactory analysis from the point of view of security. For example if cryptographer 1 ascribes probability 0.999 to paid 2 and probability 0.001 to paid 3 , then both are possible, but for all practical purposes it is as good as known that paid 2 . Chaum, indeed, shows that the protocol satisfies a stronger probabilistic anonymity property. In the subsequent literature [21, 13] on anonymity protocols, several different probabilistic definitions of anonymity have been proposed:
1. A sender is possibly innocent if, from the attacker's point of view, there is a nontrivial probability that the real sender is someone else. For the DC protocol we can express this by the formula (2) of Table 3 , where is a small positive number.
2. A sender is probably innocent if, from the attacker's point of view, the sender appears no more likely to be the originator of the message than to not be the originator. The formula for this is (3).
3. A sender is beyond suspicion if, though the attacker can see the evidence of a sent message, the sender appears no more likely to be the originator of the message than any other potential sender in the system. This can be expressed as formula (4).
4. Conditional Anonymity [13] in the cryptographers protocol can be characterized by formula (5) . Intuitively, this formula says that all though the protocol reveals whether one of the cryptographers paid, that is all the new information that any cryptographer learns about who is the culprit: the probability ascribed to the payer being the culprit is not increased over i's prior for this any more than follows from just this new knowledge. (Note that the protocol satisfies
Besides these different notions of anonymity, the literature has considered the effect of deviations from uniform probability distributions [4] . There are two sources of probability in the protocol: the prior probability of any of the cryptographers being the payer (which might, e.g., assign a higher probability to rich Adi over poor David), and the coin tosses.
We use the notation w 1 : w 2 : . . . : w k to denote the distribution in which the i-th component has probability w i /(w 1 + . . . w k ). thus, a prior of n : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 means that, in a protocol of 4 cryptographers, with probability n n+4
, the cryptographer 1 pays, with probability 1 n+4
, other agents pay, and with probability 1 n+4 , no one pays. A coin might be fair or unfair: a fair coin gives a half-to-half chance for each side, while a unfair coin gives different chances for heads and tails. A n : 1 coin means that there is probability n n+1 that it lands heads and probability 1 n+1 that it lands tails. We have experimentally studied the effectiveness of our algorithm for checking these properties. Figure 3 compares the runtimes, for different numbers of cryptographers, for the nondeterministic specification (1) solved by the algorithm proposed in [28] , with those for the probabilistic specification (2), with fair coins, solved by the algorithm of the present paper. (Very similar runtimes are found for the other probabilistic specifications.) The results indicate that the move from nondeterministic to a probabilistic model checking does come at the cost of increased runtime and a steeper slope. Both approaches appear to grow at an exponential rate, so in the case of this protocol it is less clear that the symbolic approach has yielded significant performance benefits. (However, [28] shows that an alternate modelling that points to possible optimizations of the algorithm of that paper allows larger numbers of agents to be more efficiently handled, and we expect that similar results could be obtained for the probabilistic case.) Table 4 shows the experimental results on the truth of anonymity properties (2)-(5) on probabilistic dining cryptographer protocols, where is fixed at 0.1 for formula (2) . We can see that, beyond suspicion is the most vulnerable anonymity degree in that small changes to the parameters (i.e., coins or priors) as described would break it. For the possible innocence and probable innocence, they will eventually be broken, with the change of either of the parameters of the protocol. Between them, the probable innocence is more vulnerable. This result corresponds with the observation in [21] . Table 5 shows the experimental results on the truth of formula (2) with the different value of . As the degree of bias in either the prior or the coins increases, we see that we need to decrease to smaller numbers in order for possible innocence to hold.
RELATED WORK
There already exist a number of probabilistic model checkers based on symbolic techniques. Most notably, PRISM [15] , based on OBDD and MTBDD, has implemented a comprehensive set of symbolic model checking algorithms on various probabilistic models of complete information. The difference with our work is that PRISM, in effect, works just with the prior measure µ R on runs. To express agent knowledge in PRISM, it is necessary to specify a formula representing a specific observation-sequence on which to condition the prior, whereas our approach has an implicit quantification over all possible observation sequences, and updates agent knowledge to the current time. [17] , which generalize PO-DTMC, have been widely studied in AI, but the focus is generally on heuristic approaches to the discovery of optimal strategies that can be taken by an agent. Belief space in this area corresponds to agent's perfect recall subjective probability, but is generally represented explicitly rather than symbolically. This area also does not focus on the general class of specifications we consider. Towards model checking both probability and knowledge, [8] works on a logic where the semantics of knowledge and probability are orthogonal and the knowledge is interpreted on current observation. However, the temporal dimension and perfect recall semantics in our work are not considered.
Security properties like those in the protocols we study have been previously considered from the perspective of both probabilistic epistemic logic and probabilistic model checking. To analyze anonymity protocols like the dining cryptographers protocol, [13] proposes some properties based on the probabilistic knowledge of the agents. We have shown in the paper that our algorithm can verify formulas expressing those properties. A different approach to specification of anonymity is taken in [4] , which analyzes the Dining cryptographers protocol by concentrating on the conditional probability P(o|a), expressing the probability of observations o under the condition of system behaviors a. PRISM has been used to analyze some security protocols, e.g., the crowds protocol [24] and probabilistic contract signing protocols [20] . These analyses concentrate on the objective aspects of the system, instead of the subjective view of agents as in this paper.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown in this paper that model checking perfect recall probabilistic knowledge is feasible in at least some simple examples. This is just a first step, and we believe that much can be done to optimize the performance of our algorithm by eliminating some obvious redundancies prior to MTBDD construction. Another interesting direction is to broaden the scope of the formulas that can be handled, to encompass a richer temporal expressiveness. We plan to pursue these directions in future research.
